Multiple red lines in the other Chinese SAR

By Choi Chi Chio; Translated by Huang Liang-wei
Just one year after the implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong, 117 people have been arrested and 64 people have been charged, including many pro-democracy figures and senior members of the media. In contrast, no one has been charged for violating similar rules in Macau, which has had its National Security Law in place since 2009.

But that doesn’t mean that Macau politics are as freewheeling and as liberal as the ways of the flashy, high-stakes gamblers in its fabled casinos. In fact, Beijing’s control over Macau is so far-reaching and effective that the tiny city just 60 kms west of Hong Kong has no energy or opportunity to fight from the bottom up. It may even be too late for social changes to break ground in Macau.

Like Hong Kong, Macau is a Chinese Special Administrative Region or SAR, and supposedly operates under the Chinese “one country, two systems” principle. It reverted to Chinese rule in 1999 — two years after Hong Kong was handed back to China by the British — following centuries of being under Portuguese control. The status of Macau and Hong Kong as Chinese SARs was supposed to last 50 years from their respective handover, during which time they would enjoy a high degree of autonomy in executive, legislative, and judicial matters, while recognizing Chinese sovereignty in areas such as foreign affairs and defense.

Yet after Xi Jinping became China’s President in 2013, Beijing’s control over the two SARs strengthened and has since tightened to an unprecedented degree. But unlike Hong Kong, which has flailed about even at the slightest hint of a mainland Chinese move to shrink democratic space, there hasn’t been much of a whimper from Macau.

Then again, Macau had already enacted its National Security Law early on — in 2009, under Article 23 of the Basic Law. That was even before China passed its own National Security Law in July 2015. Notably, Article 23 among other things prohibits “treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the Central People’s Government.” Macau has had other national security-related legislations since, but these have not attracted much attention locally and also overseas.

Red lines and no reactions

Some observers have said that the Macau people have not reacted to Beijing’s increasing control over them in the same manner as those in Hong Kong partly because more than half of Macau’s current residents were actually born in the mainland; their identity as Chinese is therefore strong. Moreover, Macau’s economy has thrived since the handover, enabling residents to enjoy all kinds of benefits from the state, including annual cash handouts.

It can also be said, though, that while Macau has yet to invoke its National Security Law, it has nevertheless drawn an invisible “red line” that Macau society cannot cross, especially when it comes to social movements or political deliberations. For those who need stronger reminders, the law’s passage had directly led to the installation of more than 4,000 CCTVs in six phases in the city of just over 30 square kms, monitoring every movement of Macau residents on the streets around the clock.

Still, in August 2019, some Macau people were moved by growing protests in Hong Kong against a bill that would allow extradition to mainland China. To many Hong Kong people, the bill undermined the SAR’s judicial independence and also posed a threat to activists and anyone deemed as a critic of Beijing and its policies. With Macau youths ever in tune to happenings elsewhere — especially in neighboring Hong Kong — via social media and the internet, people in Macau started considering taking to streets as well in solidarity with the Hong Kong resistance.

But those who tried to respond to a call to do so on the evening of 19 August 2019 found themselves face to face with Macau police, who disallowed the rally on the grounds that its purpose was “to express support for illegal acts.”

That night, a large number of uniformed and undercover police officers occupied every corner surrounding one of Macau’s famous landmarks, the Pavilion, checking the identities of those passing by. Seven people were brought back to police stations for further investigation, including two youths who were found with two “Anti-Extradition Law” stickers in their bags. It was the first time the Macau police conducted substantive political censorship on a rally’s content and participants. Said one of the rally leaders: “The police rejected the rally application with severe wording and said that the demands at the rally might involve subversion of state power.”

Many of the would-be rallyists were students in their early 20s. Apparently wary of possible consequences, they did not insist in pushing through with the event. Much to Macau residents’ surprise, however, one of the rally’s initiators was asked to leave Macau temporarily for a “voluntary trip” on the eve of Xi Jinping’s visit in December that year. Relatives of the rally leads in the mainland also received warnings, as did outspoken Macau journalists. For mainlanders, such “guilt-by-association” and “travel” methods used by the Chinese police to control Chinese human rights defenders and dissidents aren’t new. But the people of Macau were taken aback by the fact that these were taking place in their SAR.

Rallies attract more official ire

Not content with the crackdown carried out by the police, Macau authorities also mobilized pro-establishment “patriotic” groups to create public opinion on social-media platforms such as WeChat against supposedly copycat protests of the Hong Kong “riots,” to deter Macau youths from continuing to profess solidarity with their Hong Kong counterparts. Even the city’s main opposition group, the New Macau Association, was persuaded to shut up; according to some individuals privy to the matter, its members were warned of possible threats to their personal safety.

Last year, Macau’s annual rally commemorating the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Massacre was also banned by authorities, citing the pandemic as reason. It was banned for the second time this year. This time around, Macau pro-democracy lawmaker Au Kam-san said that the Public Security Police Force saw the annual vigil as violating “Articles 177, 181 and 298 of the Penal Code, as well as the Principal of Goodwill of the Code of Administrative Procedure.” Activists also posted police documents online in which slogans and phrases used by previous 4 June rallies in Macau were described as defaming and slandering the central government, as well as inciting subversion and disturbing harmony in society. Remarked Au to the online Hong Kong Free Press: “For 30 years it was never illegal, and suddenly [they] said it’s illegal.”

The Macau Union of Democratic Development, the rally organizer and which is chaired by Au, brought the matter to court. Last 3 June, Macau’s Court of Final Appeal decided that the rally was an attack on the Chinese government. Relying fully on a 1989 document issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of China (CCCPC), the court said that the demands issued at the 4 June rallies were slanderous and insulting to the Chinese Communist Party and ruled against the Macau Union’s appeal. This means events such as the commemoration of the Tiananmen Massacre that appear to hold the CCP accountable for human- rights violations have been deemed illegal;  they will thus no longer be allowed in Macau.

More and more restrictions

In truth, restrictions had been multiplying in Macau much earlier, but without much notice. This is even as pro-Beijing Macau Legislative Assembly President Ko Hoi Yin in December 2019 had declared publicly that since the legislature had already reached a consensus to protect national security and interests, all bills related to national security will be passed quickly and smoothly. He added that the National Security Law, which does not cover procedural or organizational law, will be thoroughly improved and implemented, and a series of “national security”-related legislation will be enacted immediately.

That same month, the Macau Cybersecurity Law came into effect, pressing the police to look for cyber risks and inform ISPs to decide on their own whether to block relevant websites. More than a year earlier, in September 2018, the Macau government had established the Commission on the Defense of National Security of the Macau Special Administrative Region to coordinate the management of the protection of national security with a specialized dedicated department. In February 2019, the Legislative Assembly of Macau introduced a revision and passed the amendment to the Law on the Judicial Organization Framework, so that now only judges and prosecutors who are Chinese citizens can be assigned to handle cases involving the National Security Law.

In July 2020, amendments to the Law on Computer Crime Combat came into effect, allowing criminal investigation departments to extract copies of foreign electronic data as evidence for litigation, with the permission of judicial authorities. Three months later, a number of departments were formed, including the National Security Intelligence Division, the National Security Crimes Investigation Division, the Terrorism Crime Prevention and Investigation Division, and the Cyber Security Division. Special duty police officer positions that are exempt from the publication of appointment information — otherwise known as “secret police” — were also created.

New laws on immigration, anti-terrorism, and interception protection of communication involving iris recognition are now under study before undergoing public consultation. The Legislative Assembly is also expected this year to prepare complementary measures to promote national security. At the administrative level, the law has been amended to explicitly include crimes against national security to be under the Judicial Police’s jurisdiction.

Macau authorities are gradually stepping up efforts to check for foreign interference in the SAR as well. Restrictions on the entry of people from Hong Kong with political party affiliation or the media have been tightened — as has the noose around Macau’s neck. ●

Choi Chi Chio is a postgraduate student at the Graduate Institute of National Development and a member of the Macau media.