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hailand’s 2024 story was one of comebacks, setbacks, and some stalled actions as the country tried to gradually move back toward a more democratic position. This early, 2025 already promises to have Thailand on yet another bumpy political ride, which may cause several rights to be thrown out and left by the wayside in the process.
But many Thais may not even notice if that does happen, since the country’s economic woes have become the focus of their attention. In 2024, Thailand’s GDP growth was second from the bottom in the ASEAN region, besting only that of civil war-torn Myanmar.
It is predicted to occupy the same spot this year, with economist Aat Pisanwanich projecting a GDP growth of 2.4% for Thailand, a figure that trails far behind his estimates for Vietnam and Cambodia, which he expects to share the lead position.

Last year had also started out with an unhealthy heap of pessimism, even though some were still hoping to see a few fresh changes via the June Senate elections. But those polls’ results only cemented the predictions of the doomsayers, who got only gloomier because of events that unfolded in August.
That month, the Constitutional Court removed Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin from office for having appointed as minister Pichit Chuenban, who in the distant past had been charged with attempted bribery of a court official.
August was also the month the main opposition Move Forward Party (MFP) was ordered to disband while its executives, including its popular leader Pita Limjaroenrat, were banned from politics for 10 years – all for the party having made the electoral pledge to amend the controversial and archaic royal defamation (lèse majesté) law.
The court decisions on Srettha and MFP and its leader have prompted mixed reactions from the public. The ruling on Srettha has been seen by some as proof of the check-and-balance system working. But others say that the court was overriding the mandate of the electorate.
As for the ruling on the MFP and Pita, it suggests that lawmakers cannot amend some laws – even if it involves a political party that during the 2023 general election won more votes (over 14 million) than any of its opponents. The strike on MFP clearly was a democratic setback for Thailand and a rude awakening for those who had believed that the party, which had young members and supporters, was surely the right way forward.
In effect, the court’s ruling placed a huge obstacle on what is already a delicate issue among Thais regarding the monarchy, press freedom, and freedom of expression.
A law that throttles
Unlike in the United Kingdom, Sweden, or even Japan, the public and press in Thailand are not free to criticize the monarchy, despite the great influence the institution has on various aspects of Thai society.
The Thai press routinely censors and self-censors even mild criticisms of the monarchy because of the lèse majesté law. Yet the Thai Journalists Association, the kingdom’s largest association of media professionals, doesn’t even try to push for the reform of this legislation, which prevents the Thai press from functioning normally and freely.
For instance, while there was some local coverage of the visit two years ago of two of the four estranged sons of the current king, that may well have been because their coming was a complete surprise especially for Thais; the visit also enjoyed ample reporting from the foreign press.
More recently, all four visited Thailand for a few days, but this has been either selectively reported (read: nearly nil) by the local press or subjected to a news blackout. These sons, along with their mother, had been forced into exile for decades; their sudden comeback to the Thai scene, while tentative, may be signalling something significant about the monarchy.
Yet the mainstream media has not offered any theory – let alone any analysis – as to what that “something” may be.
But then it’s really not hard to see why the Thai press has chosen to keep mum. At present, there are already 30 individuals behind bars for allegedly violating the lèse majesté law – some in remand prison while still on trial and others already sentenced by the courts.
Chief among the so-called “prisoners of conscience” is monarchy-reform movement co-leader Arnon Nampa, who is serving combined sentences of 18 years, but could still be slapped with more due to other pending court cases.
The monarchy-reform movement itself, while not in shackles, is struggling to keep visible and on track. That has become more difficult, though, after the movement faced a bifurcation in 2024, with some key elements who fled abroad espousing increasingly republican sentiments instead of a monarchy-reform call.
This has created confusion among the public over whether the monarchy-reform movement is in fact a Trojan horse for a republican movement, and has probably caused it to lose considerable support. (To be fair to those who may really be in a republican state of mind, revealing their true sentiments in public can land them in hot water, since it is illegal under the Thai constitution to call for the establishment of a Thai republic. According to the country’s charter, Thailand can be governed only in a “democratic system with the King as the head of state.”)
Notwithstanding the “republican-reform” confusion, the movement has also lost supporters to the ruling Pheu Thai party led by the Shinawatra clan. That could affect as well the bail surety for lèse-majesté defendants that was being funded by the public. In addition, some of the defendants jumped bail by fleeing overseas, which quite obviously does little to encourage more people to help fill the bail kitty.
Pheu Thai’s de facto leader Thaksin Shinawatra himself had fled Thailand more than 15 years ago. He was then just a year into his second term as Thailand’s prime minister when he went to self-exile overseas instead of facing what he said were trumped-up charges of corruption and abuse of power.
He was convicted in absentia, but when he returned to Thailand in 2023, the king commuted his eight-year prison sentence to one year. Even then, Thaksin did not spend a single night in jail, but served his sentence in a police hospital.
The current prime minister, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, is Thaksin’s daughter and the third member of her formidable clan to hold the post. Interestingly, Thaksin and his then party Thai Rak Thai were considered a threat to the monarchy during his time as premier, largely because of his popularity among the masses, especially those from the rural areas.
Since his return to Thailand nearly two years ago, Thaksin has been considered an important behind-the-scenes player in the country’s politics. He probably was among the key decision-makers in Pheu Thai’s turning its back on MFP, with which it had purportedly been allies, and then sealing a deal with military-affiliated parties. Pheu Thai has also since taken up a royalist stance in an effort to appease the conservative elites.
It is expected to keep adhering to royalist ideology, thus thwarting any attempt to reform the monarchy or the lèse majesté law.
Still outside the barracks
There are, of course, not a few Thais who were not too happy about Thaksin’s return and his family’s remarkable political comeback. What most Thais would like to see, though, is the military’s return to the barracks.
After all, no one really believes that the military is now under the civilian government’s control, despite having civilians as prime minister and defense minister.
Late last year, there was even a very public attempt to put the military under real civilian control through legislative reform. An MP from Pheu Thai proposed a draft bill to transfer key powers from the army chief and put it under civilian oversight.
One particular provision called for the power to appoint generals and commanders in charge of troops to be transferred from the army chief to the Cabinet.
Yet a few days after the idea was floated and made news, Prime Minister Paetongtarn herself publicly stated that her party did not support the idea. Realizing that any attempt to truly rein in the army will be rejected by the army top brass and the deep state, many are now resigned to having the armed forces – particularly the army, which has staged over a dozen military coups since the 1932 revolt that ended absolute monarchy – continue to behave like a state within a state.
Then again, the armed forces will still have to contend with the opposition People’s Party, the rebrand of the dissolved MFP, which will seek to pass a draft bill to reform the military.
No other major party has the will or courage to publicly declare itself the enemy of the state within a state, especially since after doing so, the chance of succeeding in pushing any initiative or policy shrinks down to the size of a flea. But at the very least, the People’s Party can hardly be faulted for trying.
Whether or not the People’s Party will also try to get the drafting of a new and democratic constitution moving to replace the current junta-sponsored charter is unclear, though. The issue has been bogged down due partly to a pedantic and strong opposition by the conservatives who constitute the majority of the Upper House, as well as a loss of momentum and diminished enthusiasm among the general public who are now more focused on economic revival.

As each day passes, the flagging economy has had more and more Thais pressed to a corner, rendering many of them, particularly the poor working class, unable to see other concerns aside from bread-and-butter ones. This is why the Shinawatras’ perennial promise of economic salvation keeps casting a spell over many Thais, even though they have yet to see signs of it being fulfilled anytime soon.
If the likes of the People’s Party are to increase their chances of getting their reformist agenda rolling to even just the size of a tick, they will have to first convince the majority of Thais that it’s not a matter of choosing between bread-and-butter issues and democracy and human rights. These can be addressed simultaneously without sacrificing effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of policies.
In the meantime, as long as a civilian government cannot truly control the army, there can be no genuine democracy or civilian supremacy over the military, and Thailand – economic laggard or not – will continually be at risk of yet another military coup. ◉