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E
ven international observers think that Myanmar’s junta is barely holding on to power.
Yet the junta, which calls itself the State Administration Council or SAC, is far from giving up and is even preparing for elections that it has scheduled for November this year.
Never mind that the chances of having free and fair polls in the midst of a civil war are slim. Never mind, too, that the junta now fully controls just 20% of Myanmar, according to some estimates.
Last October, SAC even conducted a census meant to support the election, but low cooperation and distrust among the population rendered the data inaccurate. With military-backed parties like the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) set to dominate the polls, violence and low voter turnout are expected. Anti-junta groups are preparing to prevent the election in their regions, further undermining SAC’s attempt to give itself some legitimacy.
Since the military seized control of Myanmar’s government in February 2021, over 3.2 million of the country’s people have been internally displaced, and nearly one-third of the population now depend on humanitarian aid.
The junta, meanwhile, has been committing egregious rights violations, including the inexplicable detention of 28,025 civilians and the execution of 127 individuals as of Dec. 25, 2024. Over 6,000 civilians, including 687 children, have been killed since the coup.
But the year that just ended marked a pivotal period in Myanmar’s struggle against military rule. Indeed, 2024 became a year of remarkable progress for resistance forces, reshaping the country’s political and military landscape and offering hope for further anti-junta advancements in 2025.

Several important incidents in 2024 have far-reaching implications for Myanmar’s future. These include the arrest warrant application lodged last November by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor for junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, mass migration, forced conscription, rights violations, and the ever-growing territory gained by resistance forces.
The arrest warrant application for Myanmar’s military leader covers crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya Muslims. The ICC prosecutor’s move marks a significant step toward holding Min Aung Hlaing accountable for his role in the Rohingya genocide and military atrocities committed post-coup.
While it remains unlikely that Min Aung Hlaing will be detained in the immediate future, the application has been enough to help delegitimize his regime and weaken his political standing, particularly in the eyes of the international community.
The charges could even be expanded as early as this year to include the massacres that have occurred since the coup, further isolating his regime.
The post-coup exodus from Myanmar continued to escalate in 2024, driven by forced conscription, violence, and economic collapse. Many youth fled the country in search of safety and opportunity, despite personal and financial risks.
One particular trigger for their decision to leave Myanmar is the mandatory conscription for men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 under the People’s Military Service Law, which SAC revived last February.
The junta has recruited at least 22,285 conscripts so far, but it faces difficulties filling its quotas due to the mass migration and continued resistance. Reports of kidnapping, presumably by state actors, have further fueled public resentment. Yangon resident Zay Aung confirmed widespread disappearances of young people, who are feared to have been conscripted.
Devastation and successes
The military has also busied itself committing one human rights violation after another and launching arson attacks. Since the coup, over 105,799 houses and buildings have been destroyed, primarily through armed conflict and airstrikes.
In 2024 alone, 23,497 structures were set ablaze, with Rakhine State suffering the most destruction (41% of the total infrastructure there). The Sagaing Region was a close second in terms of destroyed infrastructure, with over 4,792 buildings destroyed there last year.
The Mandalay Region saw significant damage as well, with at least 3,622 buildings burned. In total, more than 63,655 properties in Sagaing Region have been destroyed, and 13,783 in Magway Region. Such attacks are expected to persist, further escalating the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis.
With the oppressive environment created by the junta’s actions, the trend to seek refuge abroad is expected to continue through 2025, even as tightening security restrictions and travel bans complicate the migration process.
The ongoing flight of Myanmar’s youth is also contributing to a labor shortage in key sectors, which will exacerbate economic challenges. The combination of migration, skyrocketing food and fuel prices, and increasing internally displaced persons (IDPs) is likely to strain the country’s resources and infrastructure even more in 2025.
Another significant incident in 2024 was the devastating flooding that affected at least 69 townships across Myanmar. SAC’s failure to issue early warnings, lack of preparedness, and delayed rescue efforts highlighted its lack of capacity for emergency response and its broader governance failures.
As resistance forces continue to chip away at military installations and strongholds, the junta’s inability to govern will become only more apparent.
Source: Myanmar Peace Monitor, U.S. Institute of Peace
Armed resistance against the junta reached a critical high in 2024, delivering major blows to the military. The most notable campaign was “Operation 1027,” which was launched on Oct. 27, 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance.
Its first phase achieved major victories before the Operation was paused in January 2024 with the signing of the China-mediated Haigeng Agreement.
Operation 1027 resumed on June 25, 2024, with even greater intensity. By early August, resistance forces had captured the northern Shan State capital Lashio, along with the Northeastern Command headquarters stationed there.
Just this December, the military lost high-ranking officers to the resistance, among them Deputy Commander Brigadier General Thaung Tun and Chief of Staff Brigadier General Kyaw Kyaw Than, who were captured in the fall of the Western Command headquarters in Ann Township.
China has exerted pressure on key resistance groups – such as two members (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army or MNDAA and Ta’ang National Liberation Army or TNLA) of the Three Brotherhood Alliance – to cease their offensive and engage in peace talks.
But these groups have formed strong alliances with Bamar resistance forces and are preparing to expand their efforts in Bamar-majority areas and liberate more towns there. Though peace talks may occur in 2025, they may not yield lasting results, as the junta’s oppression remains a central issue.
Since the coup, 89 townships have been liberated across Myanmar. Townships that came under the control of resistance forces in 2024 include nine in Shan State, 11 in Kachin State, three in Karenni State (bordering Shan), three in Karen State, nine in Chin State, six in Central Burma (Sagaing and Mandalay), and 18 in Rakhine State.

In Rakhine State, only three and a half townships remain under the junta, highlighting the dominance of the Arakan Army (AA, the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s third member) in the region. The year also witnessed the complete liberation of Southern Chin, Northern and Eastern Kachin, and Northern Shan.
These liberated regions demonstrate both the military’s declining control and the resistance groups’ increasing capacity to govern. Their liberation also sets the stage for intensified operations in 2025, with Bamar-majority areas such as Magway, Sagaing, Mandalay, Yangon, and Ayeyarwaddy emerging as focal points for future anti-junta operations.
The resistance forces’ next steps?
Magway’s strategic location makes it a key target for resistance forces. The Arakan Army’s recent capture of Ann Township, which borders Magway, has created an opportunity for it to expand operations further into the region.
With Chin State’s southern border towns already liberated, the military in Magway faces growing pressure from multiple fronts, making it a likely site for significant resistance gains in 2025.
Said a conflict researcher from Magway: “We already know the Arakan Army will increase their conflict in Ann.
In Magway, the resistance groups have been preparing and discussing for months to join effectively and take advantage of the junta’s losses to achieve a liberated Magway area by 2025.”
Sagaing, though, remains a cornerstone of resistance operations. Sharing borders with fully liberated areas of Chin and Kachin States, the region provides logistical and strategic advantages. The well-established resistance presence in Sagaing suggests that more towns are likely to be liberated in 2025.
Mandalay’s proximity to Northern Shan State, which is now fully under the resistance, makes it another area with a high potential for expansion by anti-junta forces. Four border towns are already liberated, and the region’s strategic importance could drive intensified operations there in the next several months.
Interestingly, it was the People’s Defence Force (PDF) under the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) that had been instrumental in liberating towns in Sagaing, Magway, and Northern Mandalay. In 2024, eight towns in Sagaing and three in Mandalay came under NUG control. But military forces were able to retake three towns – Kani, Kawlin, and Depayin – in Sagaing.
To solidify governance in liberated areas, the NUG has expanded and strengthened its People’s Administration Body (Pa Aa Pha), which now delivers public services at the village and township levels. High-ranking NUG officials, including the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, have made visits to liberated towns in Sagaing, underscoring NUG’s growing influence.
There have been occasional reports of mismanagement by the NUG, however. Thus, in his New Year’s speech, Acting President Duwa Lashi La announced plans to reform NUG’s ministries and departments.
On the international front, the U.N. Credentials Committee recently reaffirmed the NUG’s U Kyaw Moe Tun as Myanmar’s permanent representative to the U.N. The NUG has also been strengthening diplomatic ties through high-profile meetings, such as one last June between an NUG delegation and the Timor-Leste President Jose Ramos Horta.
Back on the battlefield, the Yangon and Ayeryawaddy regions have seen limited armed clashes so far. But the ongoing conflict in Ann Township positions Ayeyarwaddy as a potential battleground. Should the resistance gain a foothold there, Yangon, Myanmar’s economic and political heart, could become a key focus for the struggle’s next phase.
According to Ayeryawaddy resident Ko Kyaw, the military has already established defensive posts near the Ayeyarwaddy-Rakhine border and forced villages to relocate. Security threats have also intensified for those traveling in and out of the Ayeyarwaddy Region, particularly affecting Rakhine residents.
Within this year, the Bamar-majority areas, where the NUG already has a strong presence, is highly likely to become the center of the resistance’s next expansion phase. The liberation of additional towns in Magway, Sagaing, and Mandalay seems imminent, while the potential for the resistance to aim next for Ayeyarwaddy and Yangon offers a glimpse of a broader challenge to the junta’s rule.
For the NUG, timely and efficient coordination with other resistance groups and alliances will be essential to launching effective offensives against the SAC, filling administrative power vacuums, and asserting its own legitimacy.
For Myanmar in general, the trajectory of armed resistance points to 2025 as a decisive year for carving a definitive – albeit violent – path toward peace. ◉