Beijing bets on Myanmar’s junta

W

hen two of Myanmar’s strongest ethnic armed groups announced recently that they may call a ceasefire and talk to the junta, many were upset as they saw the move not only as ill-advised, but also yet another proof of China’s meddling in Myanmar’s affairs.

It was no secret, after all, that the Ta’aung National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) were willing to sit down with the junta only because Beijing had put pressure on them.

To local and foreign observers, however, any pause in the military press by the two groups was bound to benefit only the junta, which has been steadily losing control of huge swathes of Myanmar since two years ago.

So far, just the MNDAA has had a meeting with junta representatives. The TNLA has yet to do the same. But indications are neither group is about to make major changes in its goals, talk or no talk, China or no China.

TNLA spokesperson Lway Yay Oo says that her organization is willing to hold talks with the junta if it is genuine about making peace, for the sake of the civilians who have been caught in the crossfire and suffering immensely. She stresses, however, that TNLA remains determined to remove the military’s administrations in its regions in northern Shan State and protect its civilian communities.

“We still carry out the implementation of our military aim,” says Lway Yay Oo. “And the aim is to uproot the SAC [State Administration Council, as the junta calls itself] and remove its military administration in our territories to protect our people.”

Meanwhile, MNDAA had its meeting with junta representatives sometime in December 2024 in Kunming, in China’s Yunnan province. But it has reportedly rejected the regime’s demands to give back Lashio and release the military officers it had captured. MNDAA took control of Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State and home to the military’s North Eastern Command, last August — a huge and humiliating defeat for the junta.

TNLA and MNDAA are part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which also includes the Arakan Army (AA), another ethnic armed organization. Last year, the Alliance launched a major anti-junta offensive now known as “Operation 1027,” because of the date it was started.

Many political analysts believe Operation 1027 plays a crucial role in the resistance movement that is aimed at eventually toppling the junta. Some of these analysts also think that the Alliance initially received a green light from Beijing to launch Operation 1027, because among the offensive’s goals is to rid Myanmar of the online scam operations that have Chinese nationals among their targets. Most of these scams are also run by Chinese nationals.

“China wants to eliminate online scam businesses in Myanmar (as well),” says a political analyst who is close to the TNLA and familiar with the matter. “It is not happy with the junta as it thinks the military hasn’t been effective in cracking down on the scammers.”

Alliance successes and Chinese worries

China’s tacit approval for its plans was important for the Alliance since Beijing has been seen as among the junta’s major supporters (largely because it continued to invest heavily in Myanmar even after the February 2021 coup). The analyst with TNLA ties says that the Alliance seized “the golden opportunity” and gained more control in northern Shan State while capturing and deporting Chinese nationals involved in online scams.

According to the Three Brotherhood Alliance, it seized numerous outposts and command centers of the military regime and at least 24 of its battalion headquarters, plus some 17 towns and trade routes with China — all during Operation 1027’s first phase, which ended with a Beijing-brokered ceasefire on Jan. 10, 2024.

Six months later, the Alliance began Operation 1027’s second phase in northern Shan State and northern Mandalay region, seizing six more towns and several of the military’s battalion headquarters.

But the fighting that helped bring about the Alliance’s successes — as well as those of other ethnic armed groups and the People’s Defence Force (PDF, the armed wing of the shadow National Unity Government or NUG) — was jeopardizing Chinese projects, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) that stretches from China’s Yunnan province to Kyaukphyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine State.

China seems to have also begun worrying about the NUG, which it apparently perceives as backed by the United States. Observers say that this is why Beijing is openly backing the junta, despite being let down by it.

“It now fully backs (junta leader) Min Aung Hlaing,” says legal and Myanmar ethnic affairs expert Aung Htoo. “When he [Min Aung Hlaing] staged the coup in 2021, China wasn’t acting openly like this.”

Instability on the border areas was bothering Beijing as well. China and Myanmar share a 2,185-kilometer border. The Chinese military has been conducting drills on its side of the border, which analysts say are meant to warn Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups to ease off. With these seeming to have been ignored, Beijing turned to putting pressure on TNLA and MNDAA, which operate primarily in Shan State, so that both would agree to a ceasefire and meet with the junta.

In early November, Chinese authorities banned the transportation of goods through the Sinphyu-Jiegoa border trade gate in the town of Muse in northern Shan State, which is beside the Chinese town of Ruili. The move blocked not only trade but also the supplies for the Myanmar communities and the ethnic armies.

Myanmar media reports have also said that to pressure MNDAA to withdraw from Lashio, Chinese authorities placed MNDAA leader Peng Daren under house arrest in Kunming after his meeting with Deng Xijun, the Chinese special envoy to Myanmar, in late October. At the same time, analysts say that China has been putting pressure on TNLA and MNDAA to hold off any offensive on Mandalay, Yangon, and Nay Pyi Taw as the fall of these major cities would mean the collapse of the junta.

Pressing on despite pressure

Even the junta itself is said to be uneasy about Beijing’s proposal for a joint security company to protect Chinese investments in Myanmar. Still, the junta seems to have been left without a choice but to agree.

According to the Irrawaddy, a Myanmar publication operating in exile, the junta formed a working committee last Oct. 22 to prepare a memorandum of understanding for the establishment of the security company.

Among the committee’s tasks, the Irrawaddy report said, are “scrutinizing the importing and regulating of weapons and special equipment,” and ensuring their proper control and usage.

According to analysts it is telling that after the visit of junta chief Min Aung Hlaing to China last November, more airstrikes were conducted in northern Shan States areas controlled by TNLA and MNDAA.

But much as it probably would like to, China has not much hold on AA, which has been gaining ground in its home state of Rakhine that borders Bangladesh. In recent weeks, AA has been taking control of one town after another in Rakhine.

Media reports say that its capture of Border Guard Police Battalion No. 5 in Maungdaw region in northern Rakhine on Dec. 15 put AA in full control of Myanmar’s 270-km border with Bangladesh. According to the U.K.-based publication The Guardian, AA has also taken over the western military command in Ann in Rakhine — yet another major blow against the junta.

In a September 2024 Irrawaddy interview, AA leader Major General Tun Mrat Naing declared, “This [Rakhine State] is our land. It belongs to our ancestors. We will fight, seize, and regain our land. Nobody can stop us. Even aliens from Mars can’t stop us.”

A veteran journalist who has visited TNLA areas several times says that China shouldn’t be too confident either about the effects of whatever pressure it puts on TNLA and MNDAA.

He says that while the two groups “may show respect to China” by releasing statements expressing their readiness for peace talks through Beijing’s efforts, both would still be allies of the PDF, which has been fighting alongside ethnic armies against the junta.

“They [TNLA and MNDAA] may not engage with the regime troops, but they will likely support PDF troops, who keep fighting against the military,” says the journalist. “They will likely provide training and military support to the PDF.”

TNLA, MNDAA, and AA planned for years to build up their armies and achieve their goals, the journalist points out.  “It is not a short-term plan,” the media veteran says. “It is a long-term and systematic plan. It requires time and effort to reach their goals. So, they won’t give up until they achieve these.” ◉