20th World Day Against the Death Penalty

11 October 2022

Today Amnesty International joins abolitionist NGOs, networks, activists, and institutions around the world to commemorate the 20th World Day Against the Death Penalty, which is dedicated to reflecting on the relationship between the use of the death penalty and torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

Although international law still allows the use of the death penalty in limited circumstances, that is only for the most serious crimes1; Amnesty International opposes the death penalty in all cases without exception regardless of the nature of the crime, the characteristics of the offender, or the method used to carry out the execution. The death penalty is the ultimate denial of human rights. It is the premeditated and cold-blooded killing of a human being by the state in the name of justice. It violates the right to life as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.

Torture and other forms of ill-treatment are prohibited absolutely under international law, including under the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘Convention Against Torture’). The prohibition is non-derogable. This means that it applies in all circumstances, including in situations of armed conflict or other public emergency. The absolute prohibition is a rule of customary international law, meaning that every state is bound by it even if they are not party to particular treaties containing the prohibition. Many of the human rights instruments that prohibits torture and other ill-treatment also require measures to prevent such abuses; to investigate alleged cases; to bring to justice those responsible; and to afford reparation to victims.

Torture constitutes a crime under international law and the Convention against Torture obliges member states to bring to justice those suspected of being responsible for any act of torture. Moreover, States are obligated not only to protect people from torture and other ill-treatment by public officials but also from similar acts by private individuals (non-state actors).

The continuing use of the death penalty in the world is concerning and is often compounded by the use of torture and other ill-treatment; for example, in cases where the death penalty has been imposed following an unfair trial where evidence obtained by torture or other ill treatment has been used.

Article 6(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) mandates that in “countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed… not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant”.2 This means that, first, any application of the death penalty following proceedings in violation of fair trial standards as laid out in Article 14 of the ICCPR, automatically also constitutes a violation of the right to life.3 In addition, the Human Rights Committee and regional human rights bodies have held that a death sentence passed after an unfair trial also violates the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.4 A particular violation of international standards of fair trial is the use of “confessions” obtained by torture or other ill-treatment. Such coerced “confessions” are inadmissible as evidence in court, and reliance on them violates the right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself and the presumption of innocence.

All countries that still retain the death penalty in their laws must take steps towards abolition of the death penalty. Pending abolition, they must respect the right of everyone not to be subjected to torture or to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and ensure that evidence obtained by torture or other ill-treatment is not used in any trial.

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1 This is the only category of crimes for which international law allows the death penalty. International bodies have interpreted this as being limited to crimes involving intentional killing.

2 See also HRC General Comment 36, §17, §41 and §42; ECOSOC resolution 1984/50, §5.

3 HRC: General Comment 32, §59; Domukovsky et al v Georgia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/62/D/623,624,626,627/1995 (1998) §18.10; Kelly v Jamaica, UN Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/253/1987 (1991) §5.14; Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan v Jamaica, (1989) §15; Inter-American Court: Dacosta Cadogan v Barbados, (2009) §§47, 85; Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, (1999) §§135-137; Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 (1983) §55; Inter-American Commission: Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, (2002) §94. See also Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, UN Doc. A/62/207 (2007) §62.

4 HRC: Larrañaga v Philippines, UN Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1421/2005 (2006) §7.11; Mwamba v Zambia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1520/2006 (2010) §6.8; European Court: Öcalan v Turkey (46221/99), Grand Chamber (2005) §§166-169; Bader and Kanbor v Sweden (13284/04), (2005) §§42-48. See also Javier Suarez Medina v US, Inter-American Commission (2005) §92.